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THWARTING IDEOLOGICAL TERRORISM: ARE WE BRAVE ENOUGH TO
MAINTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE FACE OF TERRORIST INDUCED
TRAUMA?
Kelly R. Cusickt
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four commercial passenger
jets, two crashing into the World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon and
one into an open field in Pennsylvania. This act of terrorism killed
thousands of innocent people and attempted to weaken the American spirit
by attacking one institution that symbolizes American economic strength
and another that protects American freedoms. The United States realized a
new and heightened vulnerability to terrorism. In response, the Bush
Administration has focused an overwhelming amount of attention on
combating terrorism. 3  On October 26, 2001 the government passed the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA
PATRIOT ACT"),4 which greatly expands the power of the federal
government to investigate, detain, and deport those people who the
government suspects are linked to terrorist activity and other crimes.5
t J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law (2003); B.A., Colgate University
(2000). I would like to thank Hiram E. Chodosh, Director of the Fredrick K. Cox
International Law Center, and the Executive Board of the Case Western Reserve University
Journal of International Law for their support, understanding, and guidance.
1 Mark Hall & Lucas Mearian, IT Focus Turns To Disaster Recovery, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/industry/09/1 1/disaster.recovery.idg/index.html (last
visited Oct. 7, 2002).
2 Administration's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Sept. 24, 2001) (statement of F. James
Sensenbrenner).
3 NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK No. 55 VOLUME 1:
TERRORISM AND U.S. POLICY (Jeffery Richelson & Michael L. Evans eds., Sept. 21, 2001), at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB55/index 1.
html.
4 Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress H.R. 3162, at
http://www.thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 107:HRO312:@@@L&summ2=m& (last
visited Oct. 7, 2002).
5 John Lancaster & Jonathan Krim, Aschcroft Presents Anti-Terrorism Plan to Congress,
WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A24.
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In enacting this bill, Congress considered how the United States
could better protect itself from future terrorist attacks, as well as how those
protections would affect civil liberties. 6 Congress tried to strike a balance
between the need to protect the country from terrorists and the need to
protect Americans' civil and constitutional liberties.
7
Regrettably, Congress did not strike an acceptable balance. The Act
created to protect against terrorism extends beyond that limited goal,
hindering the Act's effectiveness and impinging on the civil liberties of
Americans more than necessary. As Professor Chimerinsky stated, "Some
loss of freedom may be necessary to ensure security; but not every sacrifice
of liberty is warranted ... The central question must be what rights need to
be sacrificed, under what circumstances, and for what gain."8 The United
States of America needed legislation to increase protection against future
terrorist attacks, but enhancing surveillance powers, as done in Title II of
the USA PATRIOT ACT, creates many opportunities for civil liberty
violations, and is also largely ineffective. Rather than immediately granting
broader surveillance powers, the government should have first improved the
management and organization of many government agencies.
This paper focuses solely on Title II of the legislation, Enhanced
Surveillance Procedures. Section II provides an overview of the pre-
September 1 1 th intelligence surveillance procedures of the United States.
Section III evaluates five provisions of Title II regarding their effectiveness
and constitutionality and suggests amendments that remedy the problems
the provisions pose. Section IV discusses less intrusive steps the
government should have considered before extending surveillance powers
that violate American civil liberties.
II. SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES
A. Pre-USA PATRIOT ACT Intelligence Surveillance
United States policy on combating terrorism has evolved during the
past thirty years. 9 In 1981, former President Reagan's Secretary of State,
6 See CONG. REc. S10569 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Debate: Uniting and
Strengthening America Act] (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Member Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary).
7 1d. at S10548 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
8 Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of Terrorism: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Russell D. Feingold,
Chairman, Subcomm. On the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights)..
9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees: Combating
Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822, 5 (Sept.
2001), available at: http://www.gao.gov/.
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Alexander Haig, announced opposition to terrorism as a focus of the
administration, and each successive administration has paid significant
attention to terrorism. 0 Prior to September 1 1th, federal law already gave
leeway to the government in combating terrorism to a degree that few
Americans realized." I  In order to understand the overbreadth and
ineffectiveness of the powers granted in Title II of the USA PATRIOT
ACT, the focus of this Note's analysis, one needs to understand the
previous law pertaining to intelligence surveillance procedures.
Until the mid-1970s, the executive branch had regularly conducted
electronic surveillance under the guise of national security without a court
order. 12 The Fourth Amendment, designed to protect individual privacy
interests from certain kinds of governmental intrusion, was not extended to
include wiretaps until 1967.13 And even then, the court expressly exempted
national security surveillance from the reach of its decision requiring a
warrant for electronic surveillance.' 4 Five years later, the Supreme Court
held that to be in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, electronic
surveillance for purposes of domestic security required a warrant. 15 But
again, the court explicitly declined to address whether electronic
surveillance of foreign governments or their agents also required a prior
warrant. 16 This distinction between domestic security and national security
caused potential confusion for both law enforcement officers and courts by
exacerbating the ambiguity of surveillance for national security purposes
and indicated that surveillance law needed to be more explicit.
In addition to unclear case law, the discovery of many governmental
abuses of authority in the mid-1970s, including Watergate, created an
antagonistic mood toward the use of executive power, especially regarding
10 See Richelson & Evans, supra note 3. Although opposition to terrorism never really did
become the primary focus of the Reagan administration or following administrations, each
paid significant attention to the issue and produced many important documents that shed
light on the policy choices faced today.
1 Brigid McMenamin, Land of the Free: Repeal of Bill of Rights? Authorities already
have a lot of legal tools to fight terrorism, FORBES, Oct. 15, 2001, at 56.
12 Hearings, supra note 8, at 17 (statement of Dr. Morton H. Halperin, Senior Fellow,
The Council of Foreign Relations, and Chair, Advisory Board, Center for National Security
Studies).
13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (holding, when the privacy a person
justifiably relies upon was invaded when wiretapped, wiretapping constitutes a search and
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). Id. at 353. Because of this holding,
law enforcement officials had to comply with the more strict Fourth Amendment
requirements when performing electronic surveillance.
14 Id. at 358 n. 23.
15 United States v. United States District Court for Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S.
297, 309 (1972).
16 1d. at 321-22.
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intelligence and national security related activities.17  The congressional
hearings commonly known as the Church Committee hearings, revealed
instances where United States intelligence agencies had used unfettered
warrantless electronic surveillance on United States citizens who were
unrelated to any source of foreign intelligence information and unassociated
with any criminal activity, all in clear violation of individual privacy
rights. The committee concluded that such abuse of executive discretion
resulted from lack of clear congressional or judicial standards. 19
To limit this unregulated discretion, in 1978 the government created
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") to conduct electronic• • 20
surveillance for national security purposes. FISA granted the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA") extremely broad authority both to investigate terrorism and to
conduct counter intelligence against foreign nationals within the United
States and against American citizens suspected of involvement with foreign
terrorist groups.
2 1
Congress deliberated about the extent of authority to which national
security surveillance was entitled under FISA and reached a balance that
was widely considered to allow for adequate protection while preserving
.... 22
civil liberties. After years of debate, Congress and the executive branch
made substantial compromises to reach an agreement on an effective
regulation. 23  The executive branch was entitled to conduct electronic
surveillance for national security purposes under a standard less strict than• • • 24
the probable cause standard of a criminal investigation. Surveillance
could also be kept a secret, without providing the notice required in
17 Americo Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First
Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 806
(1989).
18 Id. at 806-07.
'9 1d. at 807.
20 Hearings, supra note 8, at 17.
21 Hearings, supra note 8, at 30 (statement of Jerry Berman).
22 See, e.g., U.S. v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (Md. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988)
(stating that, "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 USCS 1901 et. Seq.) does not
violate Fourth Amendment, since statutory safeguards provide sufficient protection for rights
of individual guaranteed by Fourth Amendment within context of foreign intelligence
activities, where governmental interests in gathering foreign intelligence are of paramount
importance to national security and may differ substantially from those presented in normal
criminal investigations; and prior to issuance of surveillance order, judicial review is
required and there are limitations to exercise of that authority and conduct of surveillance.").
50 U.S.C.S. § 1802 interpretative notes and decisions, ann. 2.
23 Cinquegrana, supra note 17, at 794.
24 United States v. Truoung Dihn Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914 n. 4 (4th Cir. 1980).
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criminal investigations. 25  In return for this broader authority, judicial
supervision was required. Also, FISA required agents to minimize the
27interception of irrelevant information. Most importantly, FISA
procedures could not be used by the government when conducting criminal
investigations.
28
Protecting national security from foreign threats requires more
expansive government intelligence powers than those allowed in criminal
investigations. Rather than limiting the discretion of law enforcement, as is
done in criminal investigations, the FISA grants broad discretion for the
intelligence community. These broader powers were required because
countering a foreign intelligence threat requires more speed and furtiveness
than a domestic criminal investigation.3 0 In addition, the executive branch
possesses the needed expertise to determine how to conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance, while the judicial branch, ordinarily in charge of
granting surveillance warrants, lacks similar experience in making complex
decisions involved in foreign intelligence investigations.
31
The constitutionality of the framework established by FISA and its
implementation has been repeatedly scrutinized by federal courts, usually in
the context of terrorism and espionage. 32 A representative case 33 concluded
that FISA created a "constitutionally adequate balancing of individual's
Fourth Amendment rights against the nation's need to obtain intelligence
25 50 U.S.C. § 1806 (a) (1994).
26 Cinquegrana, supra note 17, at 812. Surveillance activities needed to be authorized in
advance by one of seven federal district court judges designated by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court as members of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC").
27 Hearings, supra note 8, at 17 (statement of Dr. Halperin). The targeted foreign power
or agent must use the location at which surveillance is directed, and the method of
surveillance must adequately minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of
information concerning unconsenting United States persons, while preserving the
government's ability to obtain the intelligence it seeks in order for an FISC judge to approve
the surveillance. Cinquegrana, supra note 17, at 812-813.
28 Hearings, id. at 18 (statement of Dr. Halperin). When conducting criminal
investigations, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe streets act of 1968 applied.
29 Id. at 30. The intelligence community was permitted to place wiretaps, install bugs, and
conduct secret searches without showing probable cause of criminal conduct, without giving
notice, or even without turning the results of the surveillance over for later review. Id
Within thirty minutes, investigators could get warrants to tap phones, search homes or forgo
the warrants all together in times of emergency. McMenamin, supra note 11, at 56.
30 See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Wilkey, J., concurring
and dissenting).
31 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-30 (1971) (Stewart, J.
concurring).
32 Cinquegrana, supra note 17, at 816.
3 31 d. at 817.
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information."3 4 The court viewed the framework of FISA as an appropriate
exercise of Congressional political judgment and as rationally related to the
purpose of protecting the United States from actions of foreign powers.35
The FISA process and its implementation have withstood substantial
judicial scrutiny.36
FISA embodies legal principles that developed over decades through
contemplative Supreme Court decisions and deliberate actions performed
by Congress and the Executive branch. 37 This development illustrates that
by taking the time both to fully understand how the act will function in
society and to compromise when creating the balance of national security
with civil liberties, we can find solutions that respect civil liberties but also
facilitate the attainment of necessary intelligence information. The drafters
of the USA PATRIOT ACT did not take such time in its creation.
Accordingly, many of its provisions did not achieve the balance of
providing national security while protecting civil liberties.
B. The Importance of Civil Liberties in Relation to Surveillance
Guaranteeing the security of the United States is the most fundamental
governmental objectives and intelli ence surveillance plays a critical role in
the protection of national security. However, protecting civil liberties is
of great importance. That is why FISA went through years of debate. The
values of the Constitution of the United States have united the country for
more than 200 years. 39 The framers designed the Constitution to protect
civil liberties in times of war as well as in times of peace. They had
recently won the Revolutionary War; times were not comfortable or easy,
and enemies posed a real threat. However, protecting civil liberties
remained a central goal. Similarly, the current threat of terrorism cannot
now be used as justification to disregard civil liberties provided by the
Constitution.
34 United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984).
31 Id. at 75-76.
36 Cinquegrana, supra note 17, at 820.
37 Id. at 794.
38 See Louis A Chiarella & Michael A. Newton, So Judge, How Do I Get That FISA
Warrant?: The Policy and Procedure for Conducting Electronic Surveillance, 1997 ARMY
LAw 25, 25-26 (1997).
39 Hearings: The United States Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution,
Federalism, and Property Rights (Oct. 3, 2001) (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy).
40 Hearings, supra note 8, at 1-3 (statement of Hon. Russell D. Feingold).
41 id.
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American ideals and values must be respected to maintain the strength
of the United States.4 2 Commitment to the principles of the Constitution in
the face of terrorist atrocities will serve justice and demonstrate the strength
of the United States to the world.43  Even before September 1 1 th, the
government acknowledged that terrorists hope to provoke responses that
undermine the Constitution of the United States. A report published
before the USA PATRIOT ACT argued that counterterrorism policies must
be effective, but must also respect the democratic traditions.
45
The USA PATRIOT ACT could have profound implications on the
democracy of the United States.46 Privacy involves the relationship of the
individual to the state, the most fundamental aspect of a government.
47
Since the beginning of the United States, "Americans have been committed
to the idea that people have the right to control how much information
about their thoughts, feelings, choices and political beliefs is disclosed.
' 48
Privacy acts as the boundary that provides protection from the outside
world and maintains human dignity. Privacy works to shield minorities
and outsiders from persecution, something America prides itself in
providing. "By reducing our commitment to privacy, we risk changing
what it means to be Americans."
51
History illustrates that, in times of peril, hastily taken measures often
weaken governmental restrictions against coercive and intrusive powers and
often infringe on civil liberties without substantially enhancing security.52
Throughout United States history, the country allowed civil liberties to be
sacrificed in face of what seemed to be legitimate exigencies of war: the
Alien and Sedition Acts, the internment of Japanese-Americans during
World War II, the blacklisting of supposed communist sympathizers during
the McCarthy era,53 and the government's surveillance of civil rights
42 See id at 16 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy).
43 See id.
44See Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report of the National
Commission on the Terrorism, 106th Cong. (June 15, 2000)..
45 See id
46 Mike France, Heather Green, Jim Kerstetter, Jane Black, Alex Salkever & Dan Carney,
Privacy in an Age of Terror: To Track Terrorists, Government Snoops will have to Track
You, Too, BusINEss WEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 83.
47 id.
48 id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 84.
52 Hearings, supra note 8, at 26-28 (statement of Jerry Berman).
53 Id. at 1-3 (statement of Russell D. Feingold).
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leaders in the 1960s. 54 These abuses should not be forgotten in this war
against terrorism, but rather used as a lesson that the risk of governmental
abuse is substantial. As Louis D. Brandeis explained, "[e]xperience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government's purposes are beneficent ... The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding."'56  This history of abuse indicates that civil liberty
violations will likely be a reality if governmental powers are not carefully
constructed with safeguards. Title II of the USA PATRIOT ACT lacks
effective safeguards.
I. TITLE II: ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES
The stated purpose of the USA PATRIOT ACT is to protect
America from terrorism. Accordingly, each provision of the Act should
be narrowly tailored to improve the government's ability to detect and
prevent terrorist actions. However, many of Title II's provisions grant
overly broad surveillance powers that extend beyond preventing terrorism.
This section analyzes five provisions of Title II: foreign intelligence
information, pen registration and trap and trace devices, roving surveillance
authority under FISA, authority for delaying notice, and the sharing of
information. The analysis examines whether the provisions are
unconstitutional, ineffective or both, and poses remedies for their
shortcomings.
A. Foreign Intelligence Information
Prior to September 1 1th , the intelligence surveillance legislation, the
FISA, distinguished criminal investigation surveillance from intelligence
surveillance. If "the purpose" of a search or wiretap was "to obtain foreign
intelligence information," not to pursue a criminal investigation, the lesser
restraints of FISA applied, rather than the stricter requirements of Title III
54 Manuel Perez-Rivas, Anti-Terrorism Proposals Worry Civil Libertarians (Sept. 25,
2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/25/inv.civil.liberties/.
55 id.
56 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
57 Attorney General John Ashcroft, the Act's primary drafter, stated, "[O]ur single
objective is to prevent terrorist attacks by taking suspected terrorists off the street."
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks from the US Mayors Conference (Oct.
25, 2001). In order to achieve this, Ashcroft explained that the legislation needed to provide
law enforcement with the necessary tools to identify, dismantle, disrupt and punish terrorist
organizations before they strike again. Id.
58 50 U.S.C.S. § 1804(a)(7)(B); 50 U.S.C.S.1823 (a)(7)(B) (1996).
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of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act ("Omnibus Act"). 59
Under the Omnibus Act, a neutral magistrate must find probable cause that
a serious crime has been, or is about to be committed in order to issue a• • 60
warrant for electronic surveillance. Requiring probable cause helps to
ensure that wiretaps and search warrants only invade the privacy of those
likely to be involved in the crime. 61 In addition, notice must be provided to
the target of surveillance during electronic and physical searches in criminal
cases, even if the information gathered does not result in prosecution.
62
Thus, prior to September 1 1 th, when gathering surveillance information for
criminal prosecution purposes, law enforcement discretion was restricted by
various safeguards.
FISA intelligence surveillance procedures lack similar safeguards
protecting civil liberties. FISA searches do not hinge upon showing
probable cause.63  The FISA gives the FBI authorit to conduct secret
wiretaps and physical searches; notice is not required. Without providing
notice, law enforcement agents can break into a party's home or business65
and conduct a search. The party will never know of the search, unless
criminal prosecution follows. Because the search warrants are secret, the
target of a FISA surveillance cannot obtain discovery of the warrant, and is
thereby prevented from challenging the search if done improperly. 6 7 As
previously discussed, in order for the FISA to protect the national security
of the country from foreign threats, it must grant broad discretion to law
enforcement officials. However, because FISA procedures are invasive,
they were limited to the narrow area of intelligence surveillance, not
criminal investigations.
1. SECTION 218 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
Section 218 blurs this essential distinction between criminal and
intelligence surveillance. It requires only that "a significant purpose" of a
59 Cinquegrana, supra note 17, at 800 (defining more clearly the proper use of electronic
surveillance in criminal investigation).
60 Id. at 801.
61 THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, How The Anti-Terrorism Bill Enables Law
Enforcement to Use Intelligence Authorities to Circumvent the Privacy Protections Afforded
in Criminal Cases [hereinafter ACLU], at http://www.aclu.org/congress/1102301 i.html (last
visited Oct. 7, 2002).
62 Chiarella, supra note 38, at 27.
63 50 U.S.C.S. § 1804 (1996).
64 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (a) (1994); 50 U.S.C. § 1825(a) (1994).
6 5ACLU, supra note 61.
66 50 U.S.C. § 1825(c) (1994).
67 ACLU, supra note 61.
2003]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
• ,,68search or wiretap be "to obtain foreign intelligence information. The
addition of the word "significant" eliminates the previous FISA civil liberty
safeguard that separated criminal surveillance from intelligence
surveillance. It allows a search to be performed under the FISA guidelines
even if the motivation is to get criminal evidence, not foreign intelligence
information. This change now allows the FBI to conduct secret searches or
to secretly record telephone conversations without probable cause when
their primary purpose is to obtain criminal information, not to gather
foreign intelligence. Section 218 jeopardizes the civil liberties of
Americans who pose no terrorist threat.
2. SECTION 218 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Although the FISA requires fewer civil liberty protections, it is
constitutional. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
requires the government to prove to a judicial officer that it has probable
cause of a crime before it conducts an invasive search to find evidence of
that crime. When creating the FISA, Congress provided safeguards to
ensure that the broad authority to search for intelligence would not be used
to evade the criminal probable cause requirement. Congress required that• , • • 72
the search or wiretap's purpose be to gather foreign intelligence. If the
primary purpose was a criminal investigation, the law enforcement officials
had to first prove the higher standard of probable cause.73 Investiating. ... 74
criminal activity cannot be the primary purpose of FISA surveillance. As
emphasized in a case prior to the USA PATRIOT ACT, the FISA "is not to
be used as an end-run around the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
warrantless searches." 75  It is not to be used as a tool to enable law
enforcement officials to perform surveillance for the purpose of a criminal
investigation when they lack probable cause.
However, the change made by Section 218 authorizes unconstitutional
activity by impinging on the Fourth Amendment protection that requires
probable cause. Section 218 now provides law enforcement officials with a
vehicle to avoid probable cause when conducting criminal investigation
surveillance. As long as law enforcement officials can find some aspect of
68 H.R. 3162 § 218, 107th Cong (2001) (enacted).
69 ACLU, supra note 61.
70 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
71 ACLU, supra note 61.
72 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56 and 50 U.S.C. §
1823 (a)(7)(B) (1994).
73 ACLU, supra note 61.
74 United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (lst Cir. 1991).
75Id. at 572.
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the surveillance relating to intelligence gathering, the surveillance is now
very likely to be allowed under FISA standards even if the surveillance is
primarily conducted for criminal investigation purposes. The word
"significant" is not enough of a safeguard to protect the probable cause
requirement for criminal investigations.
3. SECTION 218 IS INEFFECTIVE
Section 218 not only creates the opportunity for law enforcement
agents to avoid constitutional requirements designed to protect civil
liberties, but also fails to effectively prevent terrorism. Instead of extending
intelligence authority to catch more terrorists, Section 218 may enable
terrorists to escape conviction. Case law indicates that courts will probably
exclude the evidence gathered under this new authority because probable
cause was not met in criminal investigations. 76 The Department of Justice
could not cite one instance in which a court has admitted evidence gathered
from a FISA search conducted primarily for criminal purposes. 77 One court
explained that the original FISA requirement that gathering foreign
intelligence information had to be the purpose of the surveillance was the
proper test because,
Once surveillance becomes primarily a criminal
investigation, the courts are entirely competent to make the
usual probable cause determination, and because, importantly,
individual privacy interests come to the fore and government
foreign policy concerns recede when the government is
primarily attempting to form the basis for a criminal
prosecution.
The court recognized the Fourth Amendment requirement as a critical
constitutional protection of individual privacy and therefore expressly
limited this foreign intelligence exception of the warrant requirement to
instances in which the purpose of the search or wiretap was to obtain
foreign intelligence information. 79 As discussed previously, Section 218
provides law enforcement officials with the opportunity to perform
surveillance under FISA guidelines even though a central goal of the
surveillance is to gather criminal investigation information. If courts follow
their own precedent, terrorists could go unpunished because the evidence
76 ACLU, supra note 61.
77 i/d.
78 Truong Dihn Hung, 629 F.2d at 915. The relevant test is not conducting surveillance
under FISA solely for foreign policy reasons because almost all foreign intelligence
investigations are in part criminal investigations.
79 ld. at 916.
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obtained by the surveillance pertaining to their criminal activity would be
suppressed in a criminal case.
The unconstitutional provisions of Title II will likely be overruled by
some courts, thereby minimizing the USA PATRIOT ACT's effectiveness.
Senator Patrick Leahy noted "some of these provisions will face difficult
tests in the courts." 8u Even if the courts are lenient in the times closely
following September 11, 2001, as time elapses the leniency will lessen, and
provisions are more likely to be overruled.
4. THE REMEDY
Section 218 does not further the goal of the USA PATRIOT ACT, to
protect against terrorism. The pre-September 11th FISA provision respected
constitutional civil liberties, while allowing law enforcement to gain
intelligence information in order to protect the national security of the
United States. Warrants under the pre-September 1 1th standard were not
denied frequently. During the first 10 years of the FISA, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court did not deny one government request out of
over four thousand matters involving electronic surveillance that used
assorted techniques directed at assorted types of targets in assorted
circumstances. Over the last decade, only three wiretap requests were83
denied from federal and state law enforcement. From 1996 through 2000,
authorities requested 4,275 FISA wiretaps and physical searches and no• • •84
application was denied under the statute. Also, the courts have never• • 85
granted a suppression motion on FISA evidence. The FISA provided our
intelligence community with the authority to investigate a large variety or
individuals and organizations, and to thereby defend against terrorism.
86
Section 218 will not aid in the protection against terrorism since FISA
warrant applications are rarely denied. Rather, it enables law enforcement
officials to search or wiretap parties without having probable cause, with a
goal to use that information in a criminal investigation. In other words,
Section 218 enables the law enforcement to violate the Fourth Amendment.
In addition, evidence of terrorist activity could be found inadmissible
80 Jess Bravin, House, Senate Move Closer on Counterterrorism Measures, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 15, 2001, at A26.
"' See Id.
82 Cinquegrana, supra note 17, at 815.
83 THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION TEXAS, Wiretapping: Why Is Congress Being
Asked to Jettison Even the Most Basic Protections?, at
http://www.aclutx.org/projects/police/HomelandSecurity/wartimewiretapping.pdf.
84 Cinquegrana, supra note 17, at 814.
85 John Gibeaut, Winds of Change, 87 A.B.A. J. 32 (Nov. 2001).
86 Hearings, supra note 8, at 30 (statement of Jerry Berman).
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because of Fourth Amendment violations. To further the goal of the USA
PATRIOT ACT, to protect against terrorism, Section 218 should be
removed from Title II.
B. Pen Registration, Trap and Trace Devices
Prior to the USA PATRIOT ACT, the statutes that governed the use of
pen registration and trap and trace devices were structured according to the
understanding that the telephone was the predominate method of
communication across a distance.87 Pen registration surveillance devices
allowed the government to capture the electronic or other impulses which
identified the phone numbers dialed on outgoing telephone calls; trap and
trace surveillance devices allowed the government to capture the electronic
or other impulses which identified numbers of the incoming telephone
calls. 88 The Supreme Court held that there is no constitutionally protected
privacy interest in the numbers one dials to initiate a phone call. This is
because "neither the purport of any communication between the caller and
the recipient of the call, their identities nor whether the call was even
completed is disclosed by pen registers."9
6
Federal law enforcement officials conduct approximately ten times
more pen register and trap and trace surveillance operations than they do
wiretaps.9 1 They use this form of surveillance frequently because courts
require few things to grant pen registers and trap and trace orders. To
obtain either court order, the law enforcement officer needs to attest that the
information to be obtained is "relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation. ' '92  Upon the government official's attestation, the court
"shall" issue the pen register or trap and trace device.93  As long as the
application contains an assertion that the information sought is relevant to
the investigation, a court will authorize the installation of the pen register or
trap and trace device and will not conduct an independent judicial inquiry
87 Paul Taylor, Issues Raised by the Application of the Pen Register Statutes to Authorize
Government Collection ofInformation on Packet-Switched Networks, 6 VA. J. L. & TECH. 4,
2 (2001).
88 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (2000).
89 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
90 United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977).
91 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, CDT's Analysis of S. 2092: Amending the
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute in Response to Recent Internet Denial of Service
Attacks and to Establish Meaningful Privacy Protection (Apr. 4, 2000), at
http://www.cdt.org/security/000404amending.shtml.
92 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2001).
93 id.
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into the veracity of the attested facts.94 Thus, issuing a pen register or trap
and trace device requires a low standard of proof, far below the probable
cause standard.
95
However, in order to have access to the contents of the telephone
communication, the officer had to prove probable cause, that is, that a crime
has occurred, is occurring, or will occur.9 6 Title III of the federal wiretap
statute governs the interception of the content of communications; content
is defined as "any information concerning substance, purport, or meaning of
that communication. ' 97 Unlike the low standard required to obtain a pen
register or trap and trace device court order, the Supreme Court has held
that the Fourth Amendment limitations on searches and seizures apply to
the content of communications. 98 Therefore, Title III limits the access law
enforcement officials have to obtain call content.
99
Before September 1 1 th, pen register and trap and trace laws had been
written in a world of hard-wired telephones, not envisioning the electronic
communication of today.'00 The pre-September 1 1th statutes' application to
modem long distant communication, such as the internet, was unclear.
Although court orders applied to Internet activity, the statutes did not
specify the equivalent of the dialing information.101  September 11th
highlighted the inefficiency and potential harm resulting from this lack of
clarity. The individuals who carried out the September 1 1th terrorist
atrocity used email and the Internet to help complete the attack. 102 In fact,
public accounts indicate that several of the terrorists received training on
the Internet to prepare for the attack. 103 September I 1th highlighted the
deficiencies of old pen register and trap and trace laws and illustrated the
94 In re Application of the United States, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1558-59 (M.D. Fla. 1994);
see also, United States v. Fregoso, 60 F. 3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that, "The
judicial role in approving use of trap and trace devices is ministerial in nature.").
95 18 U.S.C.S. § 3123 (1993).
96 18 U.S.C.S. § 3122 (1993).
9' 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1996).
98 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 9 1.
99 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1996). A law enforcement official may intercept the content of
communications only when a court order is issued upon finding probable cause to believe
that an individual is committing one of a list of specifically enumerated crimes, that
communications concerning the specific offense will be obtained, and that the pertinent
facility is used by the alleged offender commonly, or is used in connection to the offense.
100 Walter S. Mossberg, In Wake of Terrorism, It's Time for the Internet To Face the Real
World, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2001, at B 1.
101 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 91.
102 Mossberg, supra note 100.
103 id.
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need to keep up with technology. Section 216 updates the law to keep in-
step with technology, but does so in an unconstitutional manner.
1. SECTION 216 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
In order to meet the needs of law enforcement investigations in a
world of advanced technology, Section 216 extends access to Internet
communications. Now, Section 216 gives law enforcement agents access to
"dialing, addressing, routing or signaling information transmitted by an
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is
transmitted," once they have obtained pen register and trap and trace
orders. 104 In addition to the outgoing dialed telephone numbers and the
origin of the incoming telephone calls, pen registers and trap and trace
orders now provide access to much more information contained in an
electronic communication: the routing, addressing and signaling
information of an electronic communication.105  However, Section 216
never defines the terms dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling.
10 6
Without clear definitions of these terms, Section 216 does not clarify what
information law enforcement officers can access. Therefore, it will be left
up to the courts. For example, courts could interpret the term "routing"
information to include a computer code transmitted that indicates from
which part of the Internet a person was requesting information, including
search terms used to locate, for example, books on certain subjects to be
ordered from on-line bookstores.10 7  Also, without further clarification,
"addressing" information might include Uniform Resource Locators
("URLs") which could describe the contents of a specific library of
information on the Internet. 108 The new definitions of pen registers and
trap and trace devices expand the amount of information law enforcement
officials can access in an unclear way, yet a way likely to increase the
intrusiveness of these devices. 
109
'04 H.R. 3162 § 216(c)(2), (3).
105 Id.
106 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNiON, How Anti-Terrorism Bill Limits Judicial Oversight
of Telephone and Internet Surveillance [hereinafter Anti-Terrorism Bill], at
http://www.aclu.org/congress/1 102301g.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
107 Taylor, supra note 87, at 5. For example, the term routing could provide access to
DATA: GET/booksearch/results.asp?WRD=prostate+cancer&userid=4MOT3. This clearly
includes content of the communication.
108 Id. at 6. For example, the term addressing could provide access to a File Transfer
Protocol Address such as ftp://ftp.mentalhealth.com/depression/treatments.
'°9Id. at 5.
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2. SECTION 216 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The nature of pen registers and trap and trace devices heightens the
risk of civil liberty abuse created by the ambiguity of the terms used in
Section 216. As discussed above, a court order granting either a pen
register or a trap and trace device can be easily obtained. Since pen register
and trap and trace device statutes lack many of the privacy protections
found in Title III wiretap law, they were narrowly tailored to provide access
to only the information not protected by the Fourth Amendment, the
numbers one dials to initiate a phone call.
However, the definition of a pen register and a trap and trace device in
Section 216 alters the intent of the old laws by allowing collection of
information outside of identifying the origin device or the destination
device of a communication. Section 216 provides a pathway to the
content of communications without having first developed probable cause.
If the courts interpret the terms broadly, pen registers and trap and trace
devices can provide access to contents of communications, thereby
violating the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
3. SECTION 216 IS INEFFECTIVE
In an effort to counteract the accusation of allowing unconstitutional
access to information, Section 216 states that the information gained from
the dialing, routing, addressing or signaling sources "shall not include the
contents of any communication." However, this cannot be true due to the
nature of the Internet. The numbers dialed to and from a telephone are not
exclusively linked to the content of those communications, but are easily
separated from the content of those calls. 112 In contrast, the contents of an
email cannot be easily separated from undefined dialing, routing,
addressing or signaling information."13 Email communication travels in
small packets, and someone must separate the content of a communication
from its address."14  Many Internet service providers ("ISPs") are not
capable of discriminating between communications to isolate the specific
types of information a pen register or trap and trace court order would
authorize. "15
11° Id.
... H.R. 3162 § 216 (c)(2), (3).
11 Anti-Terrorism Bill, supra note 106. After a telephone call is made, that part of the
circuit switch network is dedicated only to that single connection. Taylor, supra note 87.
13 id..
" 4 id.
11 Taylor, supra note 87.
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The FBI proposes as a solution that it obtain the entire message, and
then be trusted to separate the information to which it is entitled by a pen
register or trap and trace device from the content of the communication. 
116
The FBI developed a computer program, Carnivore, which enables the
interception and collection of only the communications allowed by the
court order.117 However, use of this program is left to the discretion of the
FBI. Although the traditional pen register and trap and trace device law
was self-regulating, when the court order grants access to routing,
addressingI and signaling information, self regulation is no longer
practical. Under the traditional statutes, law enforcement officers could
not reveal the content of communications because they only had access to
the numbers dialed."19 However, Section 216 provides the opportunity to
willfully intrude on legitimately held privacy because the content of the call
can be accessed. Making the FBI its own watch dog creates a situation ripe
for abuse and therefore should not be allowed.
The FBI has abused its powers in the past. The FBI has investigated
people because of ethnic background or political viewpoint, both of which
unjustly invade the sacred American right of individual privacy. For
example, the FBI conducted the COINTERLPRO investigation to spy upon
and disrupt the anti-Vietnam War and pro-civil rights movements in the late
1960s and early 1970s. 12  Even during the 1980s, the FBI investigated the
Committee In Solidarity With The People of El Salvador because this
committee's members opposed the US policy of aiding repressive regimes
in Central America (although this speech is traditionally protected by the
First Amendment).' 2
The risk of abuse is extenuated by a report presented to the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") that concluded that Carnivore
presented several problems regarding its ability to filter information in
packet-based networks such as the internet. This report ultimately
116 Anti-Terrorism Bill, supra note 106.
117 Taylor, supra note 87.
118Id. at 7.
19Id.
120 ACLU, supra note 61.
121 id.
122 See JOINT EXPERTS, COMMITTEE TR 45, TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ON SURVEILLANCE OF
PACKET-MODE TECHNOLOGIES 12-13 (Sept. 29, 2000), available at
http://www.tiaonline.org/policy/filings/JEMRptFinal_092900.pdf. Carnivore has not yet
proven effective in situations where the target's communications are part of a high
bandwidth transmission. Second, many aspects of Carnivore are still untested such as
certification or testing of the product and uncertainty about whether the filter produces
information that is coextensive with call identifying information and who establishes the
criteria for separation.
2003]
CASE W. RES. J. 1NT'L L.
concludes that "there is no reliable method for determining the Pen Register
and Trap and Trace information when monitoring a packet stream."
2 3
Therefore, the FBI cannot be allowed to self regulate the separation of court
authorized information traveling over the Internet.
Section 216 does not prevent access to the content of communications
by simply forbidding it. The nature of the Internet combined with the
ambiguity of the terms routing, addressing and signaling information ensure
content will be viewed. If courts find that pen registers and trap and trace
devices cannot constitutionally reveal content of the communications,
Section 216 will be ineffective in protecting against terrorism. Any
incriminating evidence will be inadmissible. On the other hand, if courts
admit evidence resulting from content obtained by a pen register or trap and
trace device, the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution will be violated.
4. THE REMEDY
An update in the pen registration and trap and trace law was needed to
protect against the dangers presented with advancing technology.
However, Section 216 needs tighter language to safeguard against the
unconstitutional viewing of the content of Internet activity. Records of the
sites a person visits on the Internet are as equally deserving of privacy as
records documenting hotel stays, car rentals and other real world
activities. 124 Section 216 should be amended to abide by the Constitution
while keeping in step with technology.
Section 216 should define pen registers as "dialing, routing, addressing
or signaling information that identifies the destination of a wire or
electronic communication transmitted by telephone line or other subscriber
facility to which such device or process is attached or applied."' 125 And the
definition of trap and trace devices should read "a device or process that
captures the dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information that
identifies the originating instrument or device from which a wire or
electronic communication was transmitted."1 26 Section 216 should make it
clear that a court order authorizing either surveillance device does not
include the interception of search terms, URLs that identify specific•• • 127
documents, files, or web pages, or other transactional information. If
Section 216 is not amended, it violates the Constitution by providing access
to the content of communications without having probable cause and fails
to accomplish its goal of prohibiting access to that content.
"' Id. at 59.
124 Mossberg, supra note 100.
125 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 91.
126 id.
127 id.
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C. ROVING SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY UNDER THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978
A conventional wiretap can only be placed on a specifically designated
telephone line at a specific location, which has been specified in the wiretap
application. 12  If the suspect changes telephones, the law enforcement
officials must reapply for a wiretap order for the other phone location.
129
Before granting a conventional wiretap, courts require that the applicant
prove probable cause that the place from where the communications are to
be intercepted is being used for criminal activity.
130
As technology advanced, wiretapping requirements needed to be
changed to remain effective. In 1986 roving wiretaps were created which
allow law enforcement officials to place a wiretap on any telephone line
from any location that a suspect uses.13 1 Courts do not require probable
cause that the place of the communication is being used for criminal
activity to grant a roving wiretap. Instead, prior to the 1998 amendment,
courts would require law enforcement officials to demonstrate that the
suspect was purposely attempting to evade conventional wiretaps. 132 All
federal courts that addressed the constitutionality of the original roving
wiretap statute found it constitutional. 133 In each of the cases, the court
found the original roving wiretap statute constitutional because of the
statute's requirement to show that the target attempted to thwart
surveillance. 
34
In 1998, Congress amended the roving wiretap act to require law
enforcement officials only to demonstrate that a suspect's conduct could
have the affect of thwarting surveillance, no longer requiring that the
128 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (2000) [hereinafter Wiretap Law].
129 Bryan R. Faller, The 1998 Amendment to the Roving Wiretap Statute: Congress
"CouldHave" Done Better, 60 OHIO STATE L. J. 2093,2094 (1999).
130 Wiretap Law, supra note 128.
1' 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-272, 604, 112 Stat.
2396, 2413 (1998). This paper will use the phase "original roving wiretap statute" to refer to
the original law enacted in 1986, and the "1998 amendment" to refer to the roving wiretap
statute after 1998.
132 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b) (1996) ("The applicant makes a showing of a purpose on the
part of [the target] to thwart interception by changing facilities.").
133 Faller, supra note 129, at 2113. See, e.g., United States v. Gaytan, 74 F3d 545, 553 (5th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (S.D. Cal. 1990); United
States v. Parks, No. 95 CR. 510, 1997 WL 136761, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1997).
134 Id.
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suspect's conduct purposely evaded surveillance. 135  As amended, the
roving wiretap statute endangers personal privacy and violates the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 136  In some
circumstances, rather than requiring the exact location of the place to be
searched, courts require the law enforcement officers to provide other
information that sufficiently defines the place to be searched in order tomeetthepartculrity " J137
meet the particularity requirement. The original statute's requirement
that a suspect purposely3 try to evade detection satisfies this 'other
information' requirement. However, the 1998 amendment's requirement
that the suspect's behavior could have the affect of thwarting surveillance
does not. The amendment allows law enforcement officers to obtain a
roving wiretap based on everyday occurrences. 139  The amendment's
standard can be met too easily to properly limit the intrusive nature of
roving wiretaps. The 1998 amendment is unconstitutional, and the same
civil liberties violation should not be repeated in the USA PATRIOT ACT.
1. SECTION 206 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
Section 206 states that roving wiretaps will be applicable to FISA "in
circumstances where the Court finds that the actions of the target of the
application may have the effect of thwarting the identification of a specified
person."' 4 0  It extends the 1998 amendment standards to FISA, not the
standards of the original roving wiretap statute. A roving wiretap will be
granted in a FISA investigation based on everyday behavior. Each phone in
a phone bank could be wiretapped if the FBI got a report that the target of a
FISA investigation simply used one of those phones once. The private
conversations of innumerable innocent Americans with absolutely no
connection to the investigation would be subject to government scrutiny.' 4'
135 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b) (1994), amended by Public Law Number 105-272, 604, 112
Stat. 2396, 2413 (1998) (emphasis added).
136 Faller, supra note 129, at 2096. Although the particularity requirement is not easily
satisfied by warrants for roving wiretaps, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to
conform to changing technology. Id. at 2115.
137 Id. at 2116 (emphasis added).
138 See id.
9 Id. at 2113.
140 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism [hereinafter USA Patriot Act], Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 206,
115 Stat. 272, 282 (2001).
141 Debate: Uniting and Strengthening America Act, supra note 6, at S 10576, (statement
of Mr. Feingold).
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2. SECTION 206 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Section 206 is unconstitutional because it extends the unconstitutional
1998 amendment of the original roving wiretap statute to FISA. By
granting a roving wiretap based only on the claim that the actions of the
target may have the effect of thwarting his or her identification, falls short
of meeting the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 142 In
practice, courts may grant roving wiretaps for virtually any FISA target.
When roving wiretaps are used in intelligence surveillance circumstances,
not criminal, they pose a greater threat to privacy because intelligence
wiretalPs3 are authorized secretly without showing any probable cause of a
cnme. Individuals under no suspicion are at risk of having their privacy
violated.
In addition, Section 206 does not require that law enforcement agents
ascertain that the target is actually using the communication device. 144 The
original roving wiretap statute required that, before a particular telephone
line could be tapped, the law enforcement agent needed to ascertain that the
target was actually using the line, although this was not required by the
1998 amendment.U That protection helped to minimize the privacy
invasion of individuals unrelated to the investigation. 146  Section 216
allows the FBI to go from computer to computer, phone to phone, without
any certainty that the device is used by the suspected terrorist.
3. SECTION 206 IS EFFECTIVE
Section 206 violates the Constitution, yet will probably not be
overruled by courts. Taking into account that the 1998 amendment to the
roving wiretap statute has not been ruled unconstitutional by any courts yet,
courts are not likely to find Section 206 unconstitutional and suppress any
information gained through the surveillance. 147 Therefore, if information
gained through a roving wiretap granted under the loose requirements of
Section 206 helps to prevent a terrorist action, the section may be effective
in protecting against terrorism. However, the provisions of Title II should
142 See Bryan R. Faller, supra note 129, at 2116.
143Anti-Terrorism Bill, supra note 106.
144 See USA Patriot Act, supra note 140, at § 206.
145 Debate: Uniting and Strengthening America Act, supra note 6, at S 10575-6 (statement
of Mr. Feingold).
146 Id.
147 Due to the more severe infringement of civil liberties when conducting FISA
surveillance, the courts could distinguish roving wiretaps when applied to FISA and find §
206 unconstitutional. If so, § 206 would no longer effectively protect against terrorism
because the evidence gathered would be inadmissible.
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be structured to both effectively protect against terrorism, and respect the
civil liberties granted by the Constitution.
4. THE REMEDY
Roving wiretap authority is already available for criminal
investigations under Title III. To protect against terrorism by keeping up
with advancing technology, it is appropriate to apply roving wiretaps to the
FISA. However, Section 206 should be modeled after the 1986 statute of
roving wiretaps. It should allow roving wiretaps to be used in FISA
investigations, "in circumstances where the court finds that the actions of
the target of the application demonstrate that the suspect was purposely
trying to evade conventional wiretaps."' 48 The original roving wiretap
statute contained key safeguards that minimized the possible misuse of
authority to eavesdrop on individuals whom are not a part of the
investigation. Also, the original law required that the actual interception
could not begin until the suspect begins or shows an intention to begin a
conversation. Roving wiretaps should only be granted under FISA if the
law enforcement officials meet this standard because of the heightened risks
presented when applied to intelligence surveillance circumstances.
The original roving wiretap statute served law enforcement effectively
in conducting surveillance on very sophisticated criminal organizations,
including drug importation organizations and the mafia.149 When Congress
passed the 1998 amendment, it did so covertly. The 1998 roving wiretap
amendment was not included in the initial versions of the Intelligence
Authorization Bills that were approved by the House of Representatives and
the Senate. 150  Rather, the amendment was added during a conference,
absent hearings and debate.151 The Explanatory Statement of the managers
of the conference did not explain why the amendment was needed.'
52
Thus, there is no persuasive reason justifying the 1998 amendment, yet it
violates the constitution. Section 206 should not be modeled after this
amendment.
1
48 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l1)(b)(ii) (1994).
149 Debate: Uniting and Strengthening America Act, supra note 6, at S 10576 (statement of
Mr. Feingold). A provision identical to that of the 1998 amendment failed to be passed after
much debate in response to the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act. See also Teresa Kolb Weil,
Roving Wiretaps: For Your Ears Only, 45 LOY. L. REV. 745, 746. (1999).
So See Kolb Weil, supra note 149.
151 See id. "When a piece of legislation returns from conference it is no longer subject to
amendment.. Congressional rules specify that the full bodies must either pass the entire bill
or turn it down." Id. at 746 n. 8.
152 Faller, supra note 129, at 2105.
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D. Authority for Delaying Notice
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that
the government obtain a warrant and give notice to the target before
conducting the search to protect against unreasonable search and
seizures. A warrant is required to minimize the privacy invasion of a
search by allowing a neutral and detached third party to determine its
scope. 5 4 However, the privacy protection granted by the warrant greatly
lessens if the target does not receive notice of the search because the agent
cannot be held accountable to the terms of the warrant. If the secret search
warrant specifies a particular place or item to be searched, there is little
incentive to abide by the terms of the warrant because the target does not
know those terms. Elimination of notice deprives the target of the
opportunity to challenge the deficiencies in the warrant, thereby denying
the target the right to assert his or her Fourth Amendment rights.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibit secret searches for
physical evidence by requiring that the law enforcement officials
conducting the search "leave a copy and receipt at the place from which the
property was taken.'" 56 Title 18 of the United States Code loosens this
requirement by allowing for the delayed notice of searches of oral or wire
communications.1 57  Prior to the USA PATRIOT ACT, if a court was to
grant delayed notice, the law enforcement officer was required to show that
if notice was given, an individual's physical safety would be endangered,
someone would flee prosecution, evidence would be tampered with,
potential witnesses would be intimidated, or an investigation would be
jeopardized. 158 The circumstances that justified delayed notice of a search
prior to September 1 1th are clearly specified, limited, and largely exigent
circumstances.
153 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
154 See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, How the Anti-Terrorism Bill Expands Law
Enforcement "Sneak and Peek" Warrants, Oct. 23, 2001 [hereinafter AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION], at http://www.aclu.org/congress/1102301b.html.
155 Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union to Members of Congress concerning
Sneak and Peek Search Warrants on Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oct. 19, 2001) [hereinafter
ACLU Letter], at http://archive.aclu.org/ongress/I 101901 a.html.
156 FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 4 1(d).
157 ACLU Letter, supra note 155. However, the criminal code never permitted secret
searches for criminal evidence. Although there is no legal authority for such actions, the
FBI sometimes conducted covert searches. Most courts, including the Supreme Court of the
United States, have not ruled on the constitutionality of this practice. Case law is limited
and confused.
158 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 154.
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1. SECTION 213 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
Section 213 broadens the circumstances in which notice of any court
order or warrant can be delayed beyond instances of exigent circumstances.
It allows delayed notice of the issuance of any court order or warrant if
three easy qualifications are met.159  First, the court must find that
providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have
an adverse result. 16  Second, the warrant can allow seizure of the item• 161
where the court finds reasonable necessity for the seizure. Third,
although the warrant must require that notice be given within a reasonable
period, the court can extend this period for good cause. 62  Law
enforcement agents now must only show that immediate notification of the
warrant may cause an adverse result, a very easy standard to meet. Section
213 greatly expands the government's authority to conduct secret searches.
Law enforcement agents can now enter a person's home or business and
conduct a search without the person realizing that a search occurred. 16
3
This section transforms extremely limited authority into an authority
available in any kind of search, physical or electronic, and in any kind of
criminal case.
2. SECTION 213 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Section 213 violates the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution by
allowing for delayed notice of searches and seizures in unclear, broad, non-
exigent circumstances. The Fourth Amendment notice requirement is
disregarded without sufficient justification. As discussed previously, prior
to the USA PATRIOT ACT, a delayed notice was only permitted if an
individual's physical safety would be endangered, someone would flee
prosecution, evidence would be tampered with, potential witnesses would
be intimidated, or an investigation would be jeopardized. Fundamentally,
159 USA Patriot Act of 2001, H.R. 3162 108th Cong. § 213 (b) (1)&(2)&(3) (2001)
("(1)[T]he court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of
the execution of the warrant may have an adverse result; (2) the warrant prohibits the seizure
of any tangible property, any wire or electronic communication, or, except as expressly
provided in chapter 121, any stored wire or electronic information, except where the court
finds reasonable necessity for the seizure; and (3) the warrant provides for the giving of such
notice within a reasonable period of it execution, which period may thereafter be extended
by the court for good cause shown.").
'6o H.R. 3162 § 213(b)(1) (emphasis added).
"6 H.R. 3162 § 213(b)(2) (emphasis added).
162 H.R. 3162 § 213(b)(3) (emphasis added).
163 ACLU Letter, supra note 155.
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the Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
It is reasonable in certain circumstances to sacrifice the target's right to
notice of a search or seizure. However, Section 213 extends the
circumstances that allow for delayed notice too broadly. Everyday
behavior of a target and frequent circumstances could be interpreted as
potentially resulting in an adverse outcome if immediate notification were
given, the main requirement of Section 213.
3. SECTION 213 IS INEFFECTIVE
Section 213 is not necessary to accomplish the goal of protecting
against terrorism because delayed notice was already sufficiently available.
If notice would jeopardize an investigation, notice would be delayed. If
notice would endanger physical safety, it would be delayed. Extending the
circumstances in which law enforcement officials can withhold notice does
not prevent terrorism because, if essential to the investigation, it could
otherwise be granted.
4. THE REMEDY
Section 213 does not further the goal of protecting against terrorism,
yet it violates the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Accordingly, it
should be deleted from Title II of the USA PATRIOT ACT. Law
enforcement officials already had limited ability to delay providing the
notice of a search to the target in explicit, narrow, largely exigent
circumstances. An official could delay notice in situations where, if notice
were given, an individual's physical safety would be endangered, someone
would flee prosecution, evidence would be tampered with, potential
witnesses intimidated, or an investigation jeopardized. This list of
circumstances sufficiently aids the fight against terrorism. Delaying notice
of the search to the target in any other circumstances violates his or her civil
liberties and those of innocent people more than it aids in the protection
against terrorism. Therefore, Section 213 should be removed from Title II.
E. The Sharing of Information
Section 203 grants new authority to share criminal investigative
information. Many officials stated that the coordination and consolidation
of information from agencies such as the FBI and CIA are needed to
increase national security. However, an improved method of sharing
164Debate: Uniting and Strengthening America Act, supra note 6, at S 10578 (statement of
Mr. Leahy).
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information between the FBI and CIA, governmental agencies, does not
mean that the type of information shared needs to be broadened.
Current law allows the sharing of confidential criminal justice
information, but with close court supervision. The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure state that information shared in the grand jury may be
disclosed only to a government attorney, assisting governmental personnel,
and another grand jury. 165  Only the court can authorize furtherd. , 166
disclosure. Last year, the Justice Department stated that "law
enforcement agencies have authority under current law to share Title III
information regarding terrorism with intelligence agencies when the
information is of overriding importance to the national security."
167
1. SECTION 203 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
Section 203(a) allows grand jury information to be shared "when
matters involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence . . . or foreign
intelligence information ... to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence,
protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in
order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of
official duties." 68 Section 203(b) extends the authority to share electronic,
wire and oral interception information in the same manner. 169 Section 203
redefines "foreign intelligence information," to permit more liberal sharing
of information about American people.' 70 Foreign intelligence information
is defined as information that relates to the ability of the United States to
protect against an actual or potential attack, sabotage or clandestine
intelligence activity. 171  This definition is so broad that practically any
behavior could fit into the definition if a law enforcement officer or judge
desired. 172
165 FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 6(e).
166 Id.
167 Debate: Uniting and Strengthening America Act, supra note 6, at S 10555 (statement of
Mr. Feingold). Taken from a Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General (Sept.
28, 2000).
168 See USA Patriot Act, supra note 140, at § 203(a)(1)(c)(i)(v).
169 USA Patriot Act, supra note 140, at § 203(b)(1).
170 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, How the Anti-Terrorism Bill Puts The CIA Back
Into Business of Spying on Americans, Oct. 23, 2001 [hereinafter Business of Spying], at
http://archive.aclu.org/congress/l 10230j.html.
171 USA Patriot Act, supra note 140, at § 203(a)(1)(iv); (6)(2)(19); (d)(2).
172 Debate: Uniting and Strengthening America Act, supra note 6, at S 10556 (statement of
Mr. Leahy).
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2. SECTION 203 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Historically, information sharing between the CIA and FBI has
enabled the CIA to spy on the American public, violating Constitutional
civil liberties. The CIA illegally investigated Americans until the mid-
1970s.173 The CIA spied on as many as seven thousand Americans in an
intelligence operation entitled CHAOS, regardless of the fact that the CIA's
statutory charter prohibited the CIA from engaging in internal security
functions. 174  This operation involved extensive information sharing
between the FBI and other CIA agencies concerning people who opposed
the Vietnam War, student activists, and black nationalists. 175 For example,
the FBI shared all of its reports on the American peace movement, totaling
over 1,000 a month by June of 1970.176
A Congressional report, the Church Committee Report, revealed the
tremendous extent that other agencies shared simple, passive information
with the CIA, essentially authorizing spying and data collection on lawful
American political activity traditionally protected by the Constitution. 177
Upon the CIA's subtle request for a particular type of information
concerning American individuals and groups, other federal and local
agencies were persuaded to covertly spy on citizens. 178  The Church
Reports referred to this type of action as "a step toward the dangers of a
domestic secret police against which the prohibition of the charter sought to
guard.' 79  After the Church Reports exposed these abuses, the CIA's
domestic surveillance activities were greatly limited. 18  The USA
PATRIOT ACT eliminates the safeguards the Church Report identified,
putting the CIA in a position to spy on American people, violating their
Fourth Amendment rights. 
181
Section 203 disregards the safeguards established by the Church
Committee Reports. Leaks from the FBI can irreparably damage innocent
people's reputation, and can frustrate investigations by alerting suspects to
flee or destroy material. The bill does not provide for judicial supervision
of the new authorization for dissemination of grand jury information
173 Business of Spying, supra note 170.
174 id.
175 id.
176 id.
177 id.
178 id.
179 id.
t80 id.
181 See id.
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throughout the executive branch. 182 The information that can be shared
about the suspect is not limited. 183
3. SECTION 203 IS INEFFECTIVE
Granting increased powers to share information will only effectively
protect against terrorism if such information is successfully communicated
among governmental agencies. Section 203 fails to address the specifics of
how information will be communicated. To be discussed in greater detail
in section IV, the FBI neither processed the information it gains effectively,
nor communicates significant details. Until these internal organizational
problems are improved in each governmental agency, increasing the
amount of information that will be share is ineffective.
4. THE REMEDY
Limited sharing of information is apvropriate, but strict safeguards
should limit the information communicated. Sharing information poses a
real threat to the privacy of American citizens. Section 203 should have
included a narrower definition of foreign intelligence information to ensure
that the information communicated between agencies only applied to
circumstances of national security threats. 185 If there are specific laws that
the Administration believes impede the necessary sharing of information on
terrorism and foreign intelligence, those problems should be addressed
through legislation narrowly targeted to those statutes. 
1 86
Terrorism is best protected against if pertinent information regarding
terrorism is shared. The CIA and FBI already had this power. 187 However,
history indicates that there must be strict limits on what can be shared.
Otherwise, the CIA could be put in a position to spy on Americans. Rather
than increasing the amount and broadening the type of information that can
be shared, practical mechanisms should be developed that facilitate
government agencies' ability to communicate. As will be discussed in
Section IV, organizational and managerial skills should be developed to
182 Debate: Uniting and Strengthening America Act, supra note 6, at S10556 (statement of
Mr. Leahy).
183 Business of Spying, supra note 170.
'
84H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. § 203(b) (2001) (granting law enforcement agents the authority
to share electronic, wire, and oral interception information).
1851d
186 Debate: Uniting and Strengthening America Act, supra note 6, at S 10556 (statement of
Mr. Leahy).
187 id.
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insure that information is shared, rather than a new power extending the
amount of what is allowed to be shared.
IV. EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES THE MANAGERIAL SOLUTION
The September 1 1th atrocities were not committed by an enemy who
sought territory, resources, or material gain, but rather by enemies of the
beliefs and values of the United States' people, specifically our beliefs in• 188
freedom, as pointed out by Attorney General Ashcroft. He went on to
promise, "we will not now allow our values to become victims."
189
However, as discussed in the previous section, Title II's extension of
surveillance powers victimizes American values. Increasing surveillance
powers may comfort and reassure scared American citizens, but does not
increase their protection against terrorism. Instead of hastily increasing
surveillance powers, the government should have identified barriers
preventing effective protection against terrorism, such as: internal
weaknesses of the FBI, inabilities to digest and communicate information,
misguided drafting procedures, and ineffective agency coordination.
A. Improving the FBI Internally
September 11, 2001, represents one of the most extensive intelligence
failures that the world has ever seen. 190 For as many as five years, nineteen
people worked on a complex terrorist operation to crash multiple planes
into several targets. 19 1 The amount of planning necessary to complete this
act suggests that the agency in charge of domestic surveillance, the FBI, is
to blame. 192 However, this is an incorrect, short-sighted presumption. The
FBI's use of electronic surveillance procedures is not to be blamed, because
when a terrorist group is cautious, close-knit, and never purchases large
amounts of illegal material, wiretapping and other law enforcement
techniques are not effective preventive mechanisms. 93  The increased
surveillance powers granted by Title II would not have stopped this attack.
Although September 1 1th demonstrated that the United States intelligence
gathering system must be improved, that is not accomplished by granting
overly broad, unconstitutional powers. The existing agencies need internal
improvement.
188 Attorney General John Ashcroft, supra note 57.
189 Id.
190 Testing Intelligence, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2001, at 31-32.
191 Id.
'
92 Id. at 31.
193 Id.
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Experts now suggest that the FBI make five changes: hire more spies;
change the hiring practices of the FBI; improve the level of professionalism
within the bureau; change its priorities; and improve coordination within
the FBI. 194 A report for Congress emphasized that the United States needs
to strengthen its human intelligence collection capacity in the form of spies
rather than intelligence gathering by satellite or other technical means.
These suggestions do not require adding electronic surveillance powers that
place civil liberties at high risk, but rather strengthen the FBI's internal
functioning. Improving the organization, management and resources of the
FBI enable it to protect against terrorism more effectively than broad,
unconstitutional increases in surveillance powers.
A General Accounting Office ("GAO") report to Congressional
Committees, scheduled for release in September prior to the September 1 I1
th
atrocities, summarized federal efforts to combat terrorism prior to these
events.9 This report argued that the overall leadership of the counter-
terrorism forces and coordination of responsibilities needed to be
centralized and clarified.' 97 The majority of recommendations involve the
functioning of already created organizations, not the granting of new
powers.' 9  As stated in the Report of the National Commission on
Terrorism, in many situations law enforcement agents are unsure as to when
the particulars of a given case merit the broader authority to be invoked.
199
This lack of clarity contributes to a risk-adverse culture that causes some
agents to refrain from taking prompt action against suspected terrorists.
200
Even though the Oklahoma City bombing officials attempted to clarify the
circumstances that would merit investigation, there is still considerable
confusion among FBI field agents about the application of guidelines.
20 1
Guidelines should specify what facts and circumstances warrant the
194 Id. at 31-32.
195 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole:
Background and Issues for Congress 4 (Jan. 30, 2001).
196 U.S. General Accounting Office, supra note 9, at 17. These efforts include:
(1)Designate a single focal point with responsibility and authority for all critical functions
necessary to provide all leadership and coordination of federal programs to combat
terrorism; (2)Direct the focal point to develop a formal process to evaluate interagency
lessons learned from major federal exercises to combat terrorism; (3)Consolidate selected
Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation assistance programs to state and
local governments into the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
'
9 7 See id. at 31.
198 See id. at 17.
199 Richelson & Evans, supra note 3, at 9.
20 Id. at 10.
201 id.
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opening of a preliminary inquiry or full investigation, enabling FBI agents
to take prompt action against terrorists.
202
B. Digesting and Communicating Information
United States intelligence and law enforcement communities are not
able to prioritize, translate, and understand all of the information to which
they have access in a timely fashion. 203 The ability to quickly locate every
pointed file, out of hundreds that could lead to the prevention of a terrorist
attack is extremely difficult. 04 In order to determine what information is
relevant, large amounts of surveillance information must be processed,
which can involve decrgpting, translating, and deciphering code words used
in a conversation. 2 Until each communication is in English, it is
impossible to tell what is relevant. 206 Essential to an effective counter-
terrorism program, the law enforcement agencies must be able to make use
of the information collected. 207 The Report of the National Commission on
Terrorism found that the law enforcement agencies were not making use of
the information they collected during terrorism investigations, nor
distributing that information effectively to analysts and policy makers. 20
8
The FBI would benefit from enhanced data storage, retrieval systems,
counter encryption equipment, and linguists to translate raw data into useful
information.
Adding to the overload of information requiring analysis, the broader
surveillance powers granted by Title II of the USA PATRIOT ACT will
generate enormous amounts of data. Billions of telephone calls, e-mails,
and wireless transmissions occur everyday, each an opportunity to use
surveillance to catch terrorists. 2 1  Sifting out the significant
communications that warrant a closer look is the difficult part.2 11 Often the
capacity to produce large amounts of data is not matched by sufficient tools
202 Id.
203 id.
204 Id.
205 id.
206 id.
207 Id.
2 8 id. at 15.
2 9 Id at 14.
210 Nicole Ridgway, We Hear You - Echelon has its ears to the world's villains, FORBES,
Oct. 15, 2001, at 48.
211 Id
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to interpret the information. 2 12  Justice Department officials expressed
doubt in the FBI's ability to handle massive amounts of information
generated by current terrorism investigations.
213
After the significant facts are gathered, agencies must be organized
well to be effective. Even in the aftermath of September 1 1th, when
security concerns were extremely high, evidence indicated that the FBI was
not successfully transmitting urgent warnings from Washington to local
police. 2 14 For example, in a region where crop dusting is common, a chief
law enforcement official said, "we haven't heard anything about the delays
on cro dusting or about explosives or the list of people they are looking
for. Another example of poor organization failing to utilize information
effectively is when the execution of Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy
McVeigh, had to be delayed when FBI field offices around the country
discovered that hundreds of documents that were supposed to have been
turned over during the McVeigh trial were never given to defense
lawyers. 216 "The law enforcement community is neither fully exploiting
the growing amount of information it collects during the course of terrorism
investigations nor distributing that information effectively to analysts and
policymakers. ''2 17  If law enforcement is not able to make use of the
information gained using powers granted by Title II of the USA PATRIOT
ACT, the newly granted surveillance powers do not protect against
terrorism, yet they do violate the Constitution.
C. Drafting Well Thought-out Legislation
Many lawmakers voted for the USA PATRIOT ACT despite concerns
that many provisions of Title II were overly broad.2 18 Senator Patrick
Leahy said that he yielded "to preserve national unity in a time of crisis,"219
not because he supported the content of the legislation. Although several
members of Congress saw value in the proposed amendments that lessened
the provisions' civil liberty violations, they withheld their support in order
212 Ted Bridis & Gary Fields, Would the FBI Know What to Do With its New Snooping
Powers?, WALL STREET. J., Sept. 26, 2001, at Al.
2 13 1d.
214 See Id.
215 id.
2 16 Id at A6.
217 Richelson & Evans, supra note 3 at 15.
218 See Jess Bravin, House, Senate Move Closer on Counterterrorism Measures, WALL
STREET. J., Oct. 15, 2001, at A26.
219 id
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to pass legislation immediately. 22  In addition, the anthrax scare spurred
public pressure to produce anti-terrorist legislation.
221
Congress completed the legislation process with undue haste. 222 The
House voted on a 175 page bill that had been written only the night before
by Congressmen who largely lacked the time to draft legislation
properly. Congressman Barr questioned whether the Justice Department
was seekinA "to take advantage of what is obviously an emergency
situation.' 2 4  The department, he said, "has sought many of these
authorities on other occasions and has been unsuccessful in obtaining
them."22 5 The enormous public pressure to act quickly to fight against
terrorism hindered much of the effort to minimize or prevent the overly-
expansive new powers in the Act.226 By rushing the legislation, ideas that
might have flowed from careful examination of the problems law
enforcement faced before September 1 Ith were prevented from developing.
D. Creating a Manageable Chain of Command
On October 8, 2001, the President of the United States created the
office of Homeland Security in an attempt to improve the coordination of
governmental agencies. 27 Its mission is "to develop and coordinate the
implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United
States from terrorist threats or attacks."' 228 The President specified that,
"the functions of the Office shall be to coordinate the executive branch's
efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against respond to, and
recover from terrorist attacks within the United States." The creation of
the Office of Homeland Security resembles the type of internal organization
that will effectively protect against terrorism without violating Americans'
22 0Debate: Uniting and Strengthening America Act, supra note 6, at S10577-8, S10588
(stated by many).
221 The Congress in Battle, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2001, at 31.
222 Id.
223 id.
224 Greg Miller & Edmund Sandaers, Lawmakers Say Bill Raises Concerns for Civil
Liberties, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2001, at Al.
225 Id.
226 Amy Borrus, When Right and Left See Eye to Eye, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at
88.
227 Executive Order establishing Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council,
Oct. 8, 2001, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-2.html
(last visited Oct 1, 2002)
228 id.
229 id.
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civil liberties. However, its creation satisfies just one aspect of the needed
reorganization and improved management of governmental agencies.
Tom Ridge, the head of the Office of Homeland Security, bears the
enormous responsibility of coordinating four dozen agencies and
bureaucracies that now need to work together to secure the nation's borders,
protect nuclear power plants, share intelligence, secure public facilities and
fight bioterrorism. In order for Tom Ridge and the Office of Homeland
Security to be effective, the agencies and bureaucracies which he
coordinates must each possess effective internal management and
communication. However, many of these agencies and bureaucracies do
not. One of the agencies overseen by the Office of Homeland Security is
the FBI. As previously discussed, the FBI does not digest and
communicate information well, 232  and has inadequate internal• - 233
organization. The FBI fails to protect against terrorism sufficiently due
to these inadequacies. To maximize protection against terrorism and
minimize civil liberty violations, each agency and bureaucracy needs to
improve its organization and communication.
V CONCLUSION
September 1 th illustrated that the United States needed to improve its
ability to protect the country from terrorism. In response, the government
hastily drafted legislation, the USA PATRIOT ACT. Five provisions of
Title II, Enhanced Surveillance Procedures, of the USA PATRIOT ACT,
either violated the Constitution of the United States, did not effectively
protect against terrorism, or both. Rather than immediately granting
broader surveillance procedures that impede civil liberties, the government
should have first analyzed the barriers inhibiting effective use of existing
policies that protect against terrorism. If done, the government would have
detected internal weaknesses of the FBI, the inability of agencies to digest
and communicate information, misguided drafting procedures, and
ineffective agency coordination. These weaknesses need to be addressed
today and strengthened to protect the United States against terrorism. Also,
the five provisions of Title II of the USA PATRIOT ACT need to be
amended in ways to minimize civil liberty violations while maximizing
effectiveness to protect against terrorism.
230 Alison Mitchell, A Nation Challenged: The Security Chief- Disputes Erupt on Ridge's
Needs for His Job, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at B7.
231 See id. (chart depicting breadth of coverage).
232 Richelson & Evans supra note 3, at 13.
233 See Testing Intelligence, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2001, at 32..
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